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Abstract. This article analyzes Dietrich von Hildebrand’s criticism of amoral sex education, which he regards as 
misleading and anti-educational in many crucial respects. Its content is misleading, because it separates human 
sexuality from its inherent connection with married love and thereby fails to do justice to the personal and intimate 
nature of sexuality. Its reductive and neutralizing approach not only fails to develop young people’s capacity for the 
transcendence implicit in moral agency, it also fails to provide the preconditions for the development of their authe-
antic subjectivity. Instead of fostering objectivity, critical thinking and autonomy, amoral sex education promotes a 
normatively closed educational environment that fails to unfold young people’s potential for value-response and to 
contribute to the fulfilling of their human potential in general.
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Ditricho fon Hildebrando moraliai neutralaus  
lytinio švietimo kritika
Santrauka. Straipsnyje analizuojama Ditricho fon Hildebrando moraliai neutralaus lytinio švietimo kritika. Atsi-
žvelgdamas į daugybę svarbių aspektų, autorius tokį švietimą mano esant klaidinantį ir netgi antišvietimu. Jo turinys 
yra klaidinantis todėl, kad čia atskiriamas žmogaus seksualumas nuo jo prigimtinio ryšio su santuokine meile. Dėl 
to asmeninė ir intymi seksualumo prigimtis nėra patvirtinama. Toks supaprastinantis ir neutralizuojantis požiūris 
ne tik neleidžia ugdyti jaunų žmonių gebėjimo transcendencijai, kurią numano moralinis institutas, bet ir nesudaro 
prielaidų jų autentiškam subjektyvumui vystytis. Užuot skatinęs objektyvumą, kritinį mąstymą ir savarankiškumą 
moralės atžvilgiu, moraliai neutralus lytinis švietimas nesugeba ugdyti jaunimo potencialo vertybiniam atsakui ir 
todėl neprisideda prie jų žmogiškojo potencialo realizavimo apskritai.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: moraliai neutralus lytinis švietimas, moralumas, būdingas seksualumui, moralinė institucija, 
moralinė transcendencija. 
Introduction
The foundational presupposition of amoral sex education (ASE) is that sex does not raise 
any particular moral issues intrinsic to the nature of sexuality itself (Mark, 2018, p. 107), 
since there is “nothing special per se about the norms which govern sexual ethics” (Mc-
Carthy, 2016, p. 15). ASE may involve considerations of honesty, concern for others, 
prudence, and so on, “but there is nothing special about sex in this respect, for the same 
could be said of decisions about driving a car” (Singer, 1993, p. 2). Sex is not morally 
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special and there is no specifically sexual morality. Since sex has no particular aim or 
goal that grounds a moral evaluation, sex does not have a natural teleology and there is 
no “natural path of adult intra-species heterosexual intercourse” (Webber, 2009, p. 12). 
Since “no sexual acts which yield mutual pleasure to consenting individuals can be con-
demned as perverse or unnatural” (Adler, 1970, p. 327), the notion of sexual perversion 
can be “assigned to the scrap-heap” (Priest, 1997, p. 371). ‘Thick’ concepts like chastity 
do not feature in ASE, but the relevant discourse is restricted to ‘thin’ concepts like 
rightness, goodness and obligatoriness, that are minimally “world-guided” (McCarthy, 
2016, pp. 12−13). 
Since ASE denies any specific natural teleology to sex, one cannot judge its merits 
without taking a stand on the moral question concerning the meaning and purpose of 
human sexuality (Mark, 2018, p. 25). The moral discourse about sex education cannot 
avoid this issue, since in the meaning of sex “we find a framework by which we make 
sense of our sexuality as human beings” (Hollinger, 2009, p. 13). At stake “are different 
fundamental evaluations of the meaning and purpose not only of sexuality in human life 
but of human life itself” (McLaughlin, 2001, p. 229).  Is there any objective meaning 
to sex, or does it reduce to the various meanings ascribed to sex by individual prefer-
ences? The current liberal metanarrative, as expressed by its key contributors like Alan 
Soble (2006a; 2006b) and Igor Primoratz (1997; 1999; 2001; 2006), assumes that sex 
has no intrinsic moral significance: individual preferences have a foundational role and 
participant consent is sufficient to render a sexual act morally acceptable. “Sex affords 
us a paradigm of pleasure, but not a cornerstone of value” (Goldman, 1977, p. 283). The 
liberal metanarrative relies on the naturalistic understanding of sexuality, which reduces 
the nature and end of sex to the individual pursuit of pleasure (Hollinger 2009, p. 29). No 
sexual practice is inherently objectionable or preferable, since there is nothing inherently 
moral about sex (Grayling, 2011, p. 8). 
Insofar as there is nothing inherently immoral in any sexual act and the amount and 
intensity of pleasure becomes the only criterion for judging their acceptability, acts such 
as rape, pedophilia and incest can be regarded as immoral on account of the measure 
of harm done to the victim, outweighing the pleasure experienced by the perpetrator 
(Odell, 2006, p. 197). However, if a liberal applies the same calculus to practices such 
as incest, bestiality, and necrophilia, she may reach different moral conclusions (Mark, 
2018, p. 111), as the liberal approach misses the inherent moral worth of sexual behav-
ior (Haidt, 2012, p. 174). Moreover, even with regard to pedophilia, the judgment may 
change, if research shows that sexual relationships are harmless and pleasurable for chil-
dren (Rind & Welter, 2014; Rind, 2017a; Rind, 2017b). 
Proponents of sexology, of whom Alfred Kinsey was a leading pioneer, have been 
especially influential in promoting the paradigm of pleasure. Kinsey’s sexological work 
“is first of all a report on what people do, which raises no questions of what they should 
do, or what kinds of people do it” (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948, p. 7).  The im-
portance of such an empirical approach continues to be appreciated (Fletcher, Simpson, 
Campbell, & Overall, 2013, p. 258) and there has been a recent revival of interest in 
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Kinsey’s work. For example, the study by Rind and Welter (2014) utilizes empirical 
material collected by Kinsey. 
Kinsey founded the Institute for Sex Research (later named the Kinsey Institute) at 
Indiana University (Bloomington), which later came under the leadership of sexolo-
gists such as Paul Gebhard, Wardell Pomeroy, June Rheinisch, Stephanie Sanders and 
John Bancroft. Kinsey’s vision for a morally neutral sex education was realized when 
Mary Calderone and Lester Kirkendall founded the Sex (later Sexuality) Information 
and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). Its early board members included 
Kinsey co-author Wardell Pomeroy and Harriet Pilpel who worked on a sex-law-reform 
project for Kinsey. SIECUS has become the major sex education organization in the 
United States, and its publications are recognized in Standards for Sexuality Education 
in Europe issued by WHO Regional Office for Europe and Germany’s Federal Centre for 
Health Education (BZgA).
The only adequate defense against the negative implications of ASE, according to 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, is the view that sexuality has an inherent connection with mar-
ried love. As an adherent of realist phenomenology, he believed that sex education ought 
to cultivate students’ capacity to perceive values and to respond to them in love, as this 
is the way to strengthen their individuality and sense of what is objectively beneficial to 
themselves. The cultivation of value-responses (love, faithfulness, admiration, venera-
tion, reverence, thanksgiving, adoration, and indignation) is central for sex education: 
all of human life ought to be organized around value-response (Crosby, 2017, p. 688). 
Separated from moral values, sex education narrows and cramps the human personality 
(von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 210).
Von Hildebrand regards ASE as “a distortion of sex, a falsification of its true and deep 
character”, and “misinformation to which the children are exposed” (von Hildebrand, 
2001). It is “pseudo-scientific teaching” based on “the latest and the worst example of 
this scientific superstition” that “the lower something ranks metaphysically, the more 
certain is its existence, and the more ascertained is it in its reality”. Thus, he continues, 
ASE “constitutes an authoritative misrepresentation of sex, thanks to its making of sex a 
mere biological instinct, and thanks to its neutralizing sex and placing it in a laboratory 
atmosphere”. ASE undermines students’ moral agency, their capacity to evaluate desires, 
consider reasons, form intentions, make and implement decisions based on their value 
experience. It fails to support the development of morally conscious persons capable of 
forming mature moral judgments based on their perception of values, who exemplify “a 
reflection of a genuine personality” as moral agents that can make evaluative judgments 
without succumbing to relativism (von Hildebrand, 1973, pp. 54−62).
The epistemological basis of ASE
 ASE builds on a naturalistic understanding of children’s sexuality, which was founda-
tional for the research Kinsey conducted within the framework of positivist epistemo-
logy and materialistic ontology. Kinsey assumed that one can acquire adequate know-
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ledge of sexuality only by observing and experimenting with the whole variety of its 
empirical manifestations, by engaging in “a thoroughly objective, fact-finding investiga-
tion of sex” (Kinsey et al., 1948, p. 4). Kinsey supported sex education that emphasizes 
biological information and undermines inhibitions that prevent the satisfaction of sexual 
urges.
Kinsey claims to achieve objectivity and neutrality by steering clear of any moral 
commitments with regard to various expressions of sexuality. He assumes that “nearly all 
of the so-called sexual perversions fall within the range of biologic normality” (Kinsey; 
quoted by Jones, 2004, p. 333). Only those sexual relations that involve clear violence 
are excluded. Instead of moral categories, Kinsey proposed the biological concept of in-
dividual variation, which views behavior on a continuum and thereby erodes concepts of 
morally right and wrong, since every point on the continuum had equal value in nature. 
Kinsey thought that objective knowledge about human sexuality is dependent on 
close observation, completely free of any value commitment, of various kinds of sexual 
behavior, “an accumulation of scientific fact completely divorced from questions of 
moral value and social custom” (Kinsey et al., 1948, p. 3). Kinsey tried to get as close 
to observation reports as possible by collecting information through a questionnaire on 
sexual history (Kinsey et al., 1948, pp. 63−70) and by observing and filming various 
kinds of sex acts in a studio (Jones, 2004, pp. 4, 605−609).
Kinsey’s preference for observation reports guided his research on children’s sexu-
ality as well. He regarded it as legitimate and necessary to rely on “records supplied by 
some older subjects who have had sexual contacts with younger boys” (Kinsey et al., 
1948, p. 160). He described children’s sexuality based on “data supplied by adult observ-
ers for 196 pre-adolescent boys” (p. 160). They recorded their observations meticulously 
and measured the “orgasms” of the children they abused with stopwatches (Jones, 2004, 
pp. 507−513). According to Kinsey’s empiricist epistemology, this was the only reliable 
way of acquiring adequate knowledge about children’s sexuality.
While the canonical Kinsey “carefully cultivated the image of a simple empiricist, 
a compiler of data who reported the facts with scientific disinterest”, as his biographer 
James Jones (2004: xii−xiii) pointed out, in reality he was not completely disinterested: 
“he approached his work with missionary fervor” with the aim to “undermine traditional 
morality”. In his zeal to produce the desired results while maintaining the image of sci-
entific objectivity, he carefully concealed the fact that “his methodology and data were 
flawed” (Jones, 2004, p. xiii).
As a materialist, Kinsey regarded sexuality as a mere biological appetite, not to be 
curbed beyond what is strictly needed by social order. As pointed out by Jones, “Privately, 
Kinsey had long believed that human beings in a state of nature were basically pansexual. 
Absent social constraints, he conjectured, ‘natural man’ would commence sexual activity 
early in life, enjoy intercourse with both sexes, eschew fidelity, indulge in a variety of 
behaviors, and be much more sexually active in general for life” (Jones, 2004, p. 512). 
Sex education can liberate children from inhibitions to satisfy themselves sexually by 
conveying the message that there are no absolute sexual norms: all forms of sexual be-
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havior based on mutual consent are normal and acceptable. Important is the easy avail-
ability of orgasms irrespective of whether acquired with a person of the same or opposite 
sex, with family members, or even with an animal, as Kinsey’s close associate Wardell 
Pomeroy (1968, pp. 134−135) points out. In a sense, young people are left to decide 
for themselves. However, insofar as there are no adequate normative criteria to choose 
among competing lifestyles, the choices will not be free in any meaningful sense of the 
term, but arbitrary according to the whim of the moment (Alexander, 2015, p. 93). When 
teaching represents all sexual alternatives as of equal value without an appraisal from a 
moral or even from a health perspective, young people will find it difficult to perceive 
the moral implications and social consequences of various lifestyles.
Von Hildebrand’s realist phenomenology
Von Hildebrand’s realist phenomenology implies that we have intuitive and experiential 
knowledge about the essential connection between sexuality and love: only the sensit-
ivity implied in love uncovers the nature of sexuality (2011). This excludes experiment-
ing with sexuality, in particular, the use of pedophiles as informants to acquire know-
ledge about children’s sexuality. While acquiring their information within the context of 
sexual acts that are contrary to love, pedophiles necessarily have a distorted conception 
of sexuality. Sexual experimentation fails to produce knowledge, as it numbs the sensit-
ivity needed for perceiving the true nature of love inherent in human sexuality: one acts 
against those values while engaging in sexual experiments. 
Hildebrand’s epistemology is based on an “empiricism of the a priori” or, one of 
“essences”. The investigation of essences involves a rational penetration into universal 
and intelligible value structures given in experience so that “our knowledge is totally 
independent of empirical verification in the sense of perceptions and of all other forms 
of cognition which have to rely on the reality and facticity of things in the real world” 
(Seifert, 1991, p. xii). It is possible to acquire direct and immediate knowledge of the 
necessary and highly intelligible essence of goodness, justice and other central moral 
values by intellectual intuition, which “grants us an intimate union analogous to that 
granted by perception”. Essences “enjoy a kind of self-presence analogous to the given-
ness of a concrete individual being” (von Hildebrand, 1973, pp. 183−184). This kind of 
contemplative having of an intelligible essence of the nature of love “looks to the unfold-
ing of the value of the object, beginning with the initial stage wherein the value radiates 
from the object and enters my consciousness, passing through the stage wherein I am 
touched or affected by the value, and ending with affective responses” (von Hildebrand, 
pp. 180−181). 
While Kinsey assumed, that his supposedly value-neutral approach gave him an ob-
jective view on human sexuality, von Hildebrand argues that such a supposedly neutral 
perspective distorts one’s view of sexuality as it leads one to observe sexuality as a mere 
biological fact without any necessary connection to love and its inherent values. To offer 
sexual information in a neutral scientific context reduces sexuality to its biological basis, 
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which makes one blind to the personal, individual and intimate nature of sexuality and its 
inherent connection to love. “As long as one sees sex as a mere instinct − as long as it is 
placed on the same level with hunger or thirst − one remains necessarily blind to its true 
nature. One may study the Kinsey report, one may read treatises about the physiology 
of sex, but they will not help a bit in detecting the true nature and meaning of sex” (von 
Hildebrand, 1966, p. 8). One who regards sexual intercourse as mere satisfaction of a 
healthy instinct on the same level with hunger and thirst is incapable of understanding 
the meaning of sexuality as the fulfillment of deep marital love. Such a perspective 
“distorts the role which sex should play in man’s life, and it renders impossible the great 
happiness which sex can bestow on the married couple as expression of their love and as 
a fulfillment of their union, their mutual self-donation”  (von Hildebrand 2001). 
Love is a value-response, which opens the eyes of the lover to see the values that 
characterize the person loved, her unique potential as an individual created in the image 
of God. Love opens our eyes to the objective value of each person that a neutral scientific 
approach fails to perceive. Sex education “in which sex is presented as a merely biolo-
gical instinct, and in which anatomical and physiological processes are emphasized at 
the expense of a spiritual interpretation is in reality a distortion of sex, a falsification of 
its true and deep character” (von Hildebrand 2001).
The dulling of moral sensitivity
Von Hildebrand regards ASE as methodically misguided because it fails to respect the 
uniqueness and specialness of sex. The problem is not merely its reductive and neutraliz-
ing nature, but the distortion of the personal, individual and intimate nature of sexuality. 
ASE obscures the fact that sexuality receives its genuine significance in the unique life-
long love relationship between married spouses based on total and irrevocable self-dona-
tion: “The very soul of the sexual act is the personal union which it effects with the 
beloved” (von Hildebrand, 2001).
Because of its “objective” and biologically reductive approach, ASE tends to use 
explicit sexual material, which violates young people’s moral sensitivity and natural 
modesty and undermines their capacity for moral agency. It deprives children of their 
natural innocence, which includes freedom from sexual thoughts, sexual images, desires 
and behaviors, and the capacity to “noble shame” or modesty, “which conceals some-
thing because it is particularly intimate” (von Hildebrand, 1945, pp. 14−15). The latter 
is grounded in the privacy and intimacy of sex and “in the intrinsic awe it inspires, awe 
of its extraordinary and mysterious quality”, as well as in “an instinctive dislike of the 
impudent, the irreverent, the defiling and the sinister” (von Hildebrand, p. 15).
The undermining of the “noble shame” or “holy bashfulness”, of the natural aware-
ness that sexuality is personal, individual and intimate by nature, may mislead young 
people into a promiscuous lifestyle, make it more difficult to resist sexual abuse, and gen-
erally weaken their ability to resist their own primitive impulses. Separated from love, 
sexuality becomes “an intoxicating charm which draws man down to the animal level, 
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a desecration of the great gift of sex – in short, a mystery of iniquity” (von Hildebrand, 
2001). The “objective” representation of sex, devoid of moral values, “offends our sense 
of modesty because it takes no account of this shyness” (von Hildebrand, 1945, p. 95). 
Protecting children’s natural innocence is justified by pedagogical considerations: sexu-
alized children slip from their parents’ guidance, which threatens good parent–child re-
lationships. In this respect, von Hildebrand agrees with Sigmund Freud, who argues that 
the sexualization of children hampers their education: “We have seen from experience 
that seductive external influences can cause premature breach of the latent stage or its 
extinction … and that any such premature sexual activity impairs the educability of the 
child.” (Freud, 1968, p. 136.)
Cultural radicals like Wilhelm Reich, who defend sexual liberation as a way of com-
bating “mysticism”, implicitly acknowledge that illicit sexual practices and the loss of 
moral purity hamper an intimate relationship with God. “We do not discuss the existence 
or nonexistence of God,” Reich writes, “we merely eliminate the sexual repressions and 
dissolve the infantile ties to the parents” (Reich, 1970, p. 182). Since young people are 
naturally inclined to act on sexual impulses, the vindication of illicit sexuality undermines 
their belief in God, as “natural sexuality is the arch-enemy of mystical religion” (Reich, 
1970, p. 178). Thus, Reich wants to combat belief in God by the mass dissemination of 
sexual imagery. In this way, Reich provides indirect support for von Hildebrand’s thesis 
that the dissemination of such imagery through classroom sex education undermines the 
pupils’ spiritual development. Insofar as ASE leads young people to act contrary to the 
Church’s teaching on sexual morality, it hampers the development of what McLaughlin 
(1984) calls “autonomy via faith”.
In von Hildebrand’s view, ASE undermines autonomous moral agency by substituting 
the epistemic authority of natural science for the epistemic authority of moral obligation. 
The Kinseyan school allows only scientific authorities as genuine epistemic authorities 
in the field of human sexuality: people should learn the facts of human sexuality from 
science and then decide for themselves which behavior to embrace or eschew (Jones, 
2004, p. 328). This view implicitly endorses a relativistic sexual morality based on the 
assumption that people lack knowledge of objective moral principles. Without a moral 
framework, young people lack adequate criteria to choose between competing lifestyles, 
so that their choices become arbitrary and their capacity for moral agency is undermined. 
To use the epistemic authority of science to undermine the inherent authority of moral 
principles will lead young people to inner conflicts, because they cannot ultimately es-
cape the witness of their own conscience, in which they encounter “something demand-
ing, something unconditionally binding, something authoritative, something calling for 
a kind of obedience” (Crosby, 2012, p. 102). Using science to undermine the inherent 
authority of moral principles, their obligatory nature will further enslave them in the 
pangs of guilty conscience by the dynamics of repression.
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Undermining of moral agency
Von Hildebrand argues that amorality misrepresents the nature of human sexuality even 
more radically than immorality, which only implies a false categorization of those norms 
or their violation. ASE neglects the morality intrinsic to sexuality and thereby fails to 
foster the basic preconditions of moral agency. The positivist approach “more and more 
corrodes the life of man, making him more and more blind to the real cosmos, in all its 
plenitude, depth, and mystery” (von Hildebrand, 1973, p. 7). This is not a merely intel-
lectual problem, but an existential one. It imprisons human beings in a view of sexuality 
deprived of its natural moral core and thereby impoverishes sexual experience.   
Teaching the amoral view of sexuality with the authority of school is “incompar-
ably more harmful than picking up information on the street” (von Hildebrand, 2001). 
Information received on the street is immoral and produces guilt, while the neutralizing 
sex education at school produces a morally indifferent attitude, which dulls the moral 
sense and the capacity to make moral distinctions. Street instruction deprives sexuality 
“of its deep and noble character”, “appeals to a brutal sexual instinct” and thereby creates 
a guilty conscience, but “amorality is still more destructive for the entire person than 
immorality”. “Street instruction may be coarse and dirty but, as horrible as it is, it does 
not deprive sex of its character as does the neutralizing classroom information.”
A morally impure person is not just superficial; he fails in his principal task, in his 
basic human vocation. “To be morally good pertains essentially to the end of human ex-
istence and to man’s destiny” (von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 174). Being endowed with moral 
values is “decisive for man’s eternal fate, for they hint at eternity and the fact that man’s 
existence is not exhausted by his earthly life” (von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 176).
That is why the amorality of materialistically reductive sex education is worse than 
immorality. An immoral person may repent of his moral failure and return to the deep 
sources of love, but an amoral person has strayed to life’s grey border area devoid of 
moral signs showing the way back to love. The laboratory view of ASE undermines 
young people’s ability to comprehend the deep moral implications of sexual behavior. It 
makes them insensitive to moral distinctions by conveying the impression that there are 
no absolute sexual norms: all forms of sexual behavior based on mutual consent count as 
normal and acceptable. Thus, ASE deprives young people of the richest source of value 
within sexual experience.
Failure to develop moral transcendence and authentic subjectivity
By reducing sexuality into a biological instinct, ASE produces superficial sexuality 
guided by the subjectively satisfying and dominated by drives, appetites, and desires, 
rather than by the intrinsically valuable. It fails to help young people to achieve moral 
transcendence and develop as persons guided by value-response and locks them in their 
immanence in a way that distorts their relationship to themselves, other people and God. 
“In desiring the merely subjectively satisfying, there is no transcending of the frame of 
self-centeredness, no conforming to that which is objectively important, no self-aban-
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donment, no reverent submission to something greater than ourselves, on the contrary, 
there is only imprisonment in the frame of our self-centeredness” (von Hildebrand, 1953, 
p. 215).
A person transcends herself in giving a value-response, and the real “signature” of the 
human person lies in this self-transcendence. A value-responsive person steps beyond 
her own needs and views the other person according to his value, because she does not 
let her interest in the subjectively satisfying curtail her reverence for values. The imman-
ently oriented person lives primarily for the subjectively satisfying: his moral horizons 
become increasingly limited so that he eventually ceases to care about what is “precious 
of itself”. The capacity to choose between these two orientations constitutes the funda-
mental moral freedom of persons, “for here we choose between radically opposed forms 
of moral existence” (Crosby, 2009, p. xvi).
ASE not only fails to develop young people’s capacity for the transcendence implicit 
in a value-responding attitude, it also fails to provide the preconditions for the develop-
ment of their authentic subjectivity. Instead of becoming more alive, they become alien-
ated from themselves, since by ignoring moral obligation they lose its “power of opening 
the depths of personal subjectivity” (von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 77). Moral obligations do 
not limit human freedom but make it possible: “In being morally bound we come alive 
as persons, we ‘quicken’ as persons, we become present to ourselves in a unique way” as 
“we undergo the profound actualization of our personal being that occurs in being bound 
in conscience” (ibid. 88).
Only when objective values have priority does one’s subjectivity have the inner order 
proper to it: “the more right order is preserved, the more intense and the more genuine 
is subjectivity” (von Hildebrand, 2009, p. 217). As objective values ultimately reflect 
God’s will and character, human subjectivity develops properly when God’s honor has 
priority over the whole of one’s subjectivity. “In this act of reaching entirely beyond my 
subjectivity my transcendence is not only actualized to the fullest, but my subjectivity 
receives its authentic character, and this even in a qualitative respect” (von Hildebrand, 
2009, p. 212). 
The awareness of moral obligation constitutes an objective call and a “high-point 
of transcendence” that at the same time is “my most intimate and personal concern, in 
which I experience the uniqueness of my self. Supreme objectivity and supreme sub-
jectivity interpenetrate here” (von Hildebrand, 2009, p. 206−207). The call of moral 
obligation is both demanding and liberating. An awakened moral conscience “represents 
the most authentic, awakened personal existence” (Crosby, 2012, p. 112).
A person’s attitude towards sex is a fundamental characteristic of her personality, 
because of “the peculiar intimacy of sex” and because “here body and soul meet in a 
unique fashion” (von Hildebrand 2001). Bodily feelings have a special “depth” in the 
sexual sphere, which conjugal love can then form. “To isolate these bodily feelings from 
the total reality of the human person means to misunderstand them, not only from the 
moral point of view, but also from the point of view of their very meaning and their in-
trinsic character. Only when seen in the light of the specific intentio unionis of conjugal 
137
Tapio Puolimatka. Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Criticism  of Amoral Sex Education
love and the sanction of God in marriage do they reveal their authentic character” (von 
Hildebrand, 2007, p. 23).
ASE does not merely impoverish a young person’s sexual experience and make it 
superficial, it also weakens his ability to perceive the beauty, depth and poetic nature of 
reality in general and “condemns him to an endless boredom.” It impoverishes young 
people’s inner life and makes it one-dimensional. Without a sense for the special nature 
of intimacy, human beings “are coarse, superficial, and boring personalities” (von 
Hildebrand, 2001).   
The distress of moral guilt and the loss of the divine presence
Moral values have a unique seriousness, which sets them apart from all other personal 
values, so that “it is a greater good for the person to be endowed with them than with any 
other values” (von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 175). To go astray morally is “the greater evil 
for the person, far worse than any kind of suffering”. That is why “the awareness of a 
moral failure affects our conscience” so that the voice of conscience “which speaks to us 
implacably destroys the peace of our soul and burdens us with an incomparable weight” 
(p. 172). Bad conscience brings a disharmony, Hildebrand argues,  “which no distraction 
can abate and no pleasures can disperse, which from the very depths of our soul seeps 
into our life, which in vain we try to dissipate, which at last we try to camouflage with 
other things” (p. 173).
What makes moral failure especially painful is that “we cannot separate our know-
ledge of our own moral guilt from the consciousness that it deserves punishment, that 
it demands atonement” (von Hildebrand, 1953, p. 174). This sense of the coming pun-
ishment implies a sense of the existence of God. Time and age do not erase the sense of 
moral guilt with its accompanying sense of the threatening punishment, but only makes 
it more painful and perceivable. “It is almost impossible to experience conscience in all 
its imperativity and yet not to experience a religious depth in it; it is almost impossible 
not to be aware of encountering God in conscience” (Crosby, 2012, p. 110). To slacken 
or diminish the sense of central moral values thereby distances young people from God.
The natural knowledge of God is inescapable even for a person who does not believe 
in the immortality of the soul: “he could not deny (granted he is really morally awake 
and amenable to moral values) that moral values involve a mysteriously intimate relation 
to eternity and a share in determining our eternal fate. He might believe this character of 
moral values a delusion, but he could not deny the fact of this character as such …” (von 
Hildebrand, 1953, p. 176).
ASE strengthens the secular tendency to repress the natural knowledge of God, 
which even agnostics or atheists find difficult to escape, since “even for the committed 
atheist, the voice of God is still annoyingly there, though perhaps reduced to no more 
than a whisper,” as acknowledged by the atheist Jesse Bering (2011, p. 47). Even con-
vinced atheists may at times experience a “mysterious sense that someone or something 
is keeping watch over us” (Bering, 2011, p. 159). Bering therefore regards it as unlikely 
that mere scientific knowledge could ever free human beings from their awareness of the 
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divine. “As a way of thinking, God is an inherent part of our natural cognitive systems, 
and ridding ourselves of Him − really, thoroughly, permanently removing Him from our 
heads − would require a neurosurgeon, not a science teacher” (p. 200). Even atheists 
cannot escape the guilt accompanying moral misbehavior and the accompanying sense 
of God’s judgment.
Kinsey wanted to alleviate the guilt people experience as a result of breaking moral 
norms in their sexual behavior, as Jones (2004, p. xii) points out: “He was determined 
to use science to strip human sexuality of its guilt and repression … Kinsey honestly 
believed that if people knew the facts, they would rid themselves of guilt and shame.” 
Kinsey thought to eliminate guilt by adopting a neutral scientific attitude and by redu-
cing sexuality to its biological basis. What he did not envisage was that such an attempt 
to repress moral guilt would make the problem of guilt worse and further disintegrate 
human personality. As Crosby (2012, p. 77) points out, insofar as we break moral com-
mands “we are haunted with remorse and shame and dread; we are unsettled and per-
turbed in the deepest depths of our being”. People may repress this distress and try to 
alleviate the pain through immersing themselves in activity or pleasure, but they cannot 
remove it.
Kinsey’s project of sex education involved an attempt to escape the guilt and “tre-
mendous emotional conflict” in relation to sexuality with which he struggled from his 
youth, as the sense of moral guilt “tapped into something in his unconscious” (Jones, 
2004, p. 83). The ultimate seriousness of moral obligation implies “the consciousness 
of directly encountering God in responding to obligation” (Crosby, 2012, p. 92). People 
encounter “the mysterious ultimacy and unconditionness” of moral obligation, Crosby 
suggests, even if they refuse to acknowledge God’s reality.
Von Hildebrand’s solution was very different from that of Kinsey. Instead of the 
amoral denial of moral norms, von Hildebrand found the solution in Christ’s forgiveness. 
He resolved the tension between high moral ideals and the painful reality of moral guilt 
by relying on Christ’s mercy.
Conclusion
We can summarize von Hildebrand’s criticism of ASE as follows: 
(1) Human beings have intuitive knowledge about the morality intrinsic to sexuality. 
The knowledge about the intelligible essence of the moral core of sexuality is 
more certain than the knowledge based on empirical observations. 
(2) Once teaching presents human sexuality in separation from its central moral 
core, it misrepresents its true nature. 
(3) When ASE conveys such a reductive picture of human sexuality, it indoctrinates 
young people into a false view of human sexuality that is further removed from 
reality than immorality.
(4) By conveying a view of sexuality deprived of its intrinsic morality, ASE under-
mines the development of the student’s capacity for moral agency and thereby 
undermines her autonomy.
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(5) The use of explicit sexual material in classroom sex education involves a misuse 
of the teacher’s deontic authority by forcing the student to get involved in activ-
ities that offend against her moral sensibilities and thereby violate the develop-
ment of her capacity for autonomy within a faith tradition.
(6) The destruction of the natural bashfulness and sense of shame undermines the 
experience of the uniqueness of the intimate marriage relationship. This makes 
it more difficult to realize the unique potential inherent in the most intimate and 
rewarding human relationship of marriage. 
(7) As the amoral laboratory approach to sex education narrows students’ perspect-
ive on reality, their personality tends to become more superficial and their life 
less interesting: they find it more difficult to unfold the whole potential of their 
personality as their awareness of the moral core of sexuality remains inadequate.
(8) The amoral perspective of modern sex education hampers the development of 
students’ moral sense and of higher values in general. Insofar as they become 
involved in an immoral lifestyle, they cannot escape the burden of moral guilt 
and its accompanying sense of God’s judgment. 
(9) Insofar as they fail to achieve the transcendence inherent in moral agency, they 
repress the intimations of God inherent in moral obligation that would help them 
to become conscious of the perspective of eternity. Such a repression violates 
their integrity as persons created in the image of God.
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